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Examining how our beliefs and behaviours factor into

 

how we consider competence and how we assess

 

competence

 

 

 

We know what is wrong…

 

As Isaac Newton wrote when somewhat modestly describing his achievements, “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants”.

 

He was indicating to his correspondent Robert Hooke, that he had learned both from the mistakes and insights of those that went before him.

 

Standing on the pinnacles of their achievements he was able to view the universe differently from them.  And of course physics has made further great advances since he was at the forefront of knowledge, by learning from Newton’s insights and errors.

 

 

In the 19th century the philosopher Ernest Renan said: “The simplest schoolboy is now familiar with truths for which Archimedes would have sacrificed his life”.

 

And how much more do we know today?

 

Similarly we have learned a number of important things from our own Maritime history, and ships and manning today are very different from 50 or 100 years ago.

 

Ever since ships first went to sea they have run aground. Our solution was to start taking depth soundings, at first with sounding line and lead and today with modern digital echo sounding devices.

 

Groundings haven’t stopped however.

 

When ships hit each other in fog we put radar aboard to stop it happening. But it didn’t.

Even when we use radar and know there is another ship out there, we still manage to hit each other.

 

When the Titanic sank and 1500 people died, we learned that it is always a good idea to have enough lifeboats and bulkheads. And when we built ships with enough lifeboats and bulkheads, we still had accidents and loss of life.

 

 

When the Betelguese blew up in Bantry Bay in Ireland, 42 crew members died along with 8 terminal staff, and we learned that it is a good thing to have inert gas systems aboard Tankers.

 

And when we put those inert gas systems aboard we still had accidents.

 

And in very recent memory we had the Costa Concordia. Equipped with the most up to date technology and ship design she still foundered.

 

I could go on, and on and on, but perhaps you are starting to get the point.

 

It seems that no matter how good the technology or systems we develop to stop these disasters from happening, the clever old seafarer finds new and ingenious ways to keep on having accidents.

 

One of the common factors in most incidents and most certainly in the Titanic and the Betelgeuse and the Costa Concordia is that every man involved in the accidents had all the qualifications required to do what they did.

 

They possessed all the licenses, safety certificates, quality systems and other training and testing that it was felt they needed at the time. In other words, they were, by industry definition, competent.

 

It is not that nothing was done. Each of these accidents taught us about a weakness in our systems.

 

At first our response was technical. We recognised that errors that led to accidents were caused by people but sought to install technological solutions.

 

In the case of the Titanic the horrendous loss of life was attributed to the lack of lifeboats and poor ship design, without considering what motivated the well trained and highly regarded Master to be proceeding at such a speed in those waters at that time of year.

 

Later we understood that the technology brought its own problems (Radar assisted collisions for instance) and increased the training and education of officers in all aspects of equipment operation.

 

So we have learned from others mistakes and rectified their errors. We have addressed technological failures with new and better equipment and have educated and trained personnel until they are fed up to the back teeth with it.

 

We have even latterly recognised “Human Factors” in accidents and built training on that into seafarers development programmes.

 

Beyond even that, we have recognised that there might be a link between company management and its ships, officers and crew, and required companies to develop “safety management systems.

 

We have undoubtedly changed our understanding of “competence” and Archimedes and indeed Newton would be astonished at how much our officers and seamen know today.

 

But still we have accidents.

 

So what is wrong? Why do we continue to ignore our knowledge and training, disobey our operating systems manuals and get ourselves and ships into trouble?

 

To answer these questions, I think that we need to go back to some of the ideas we have about ourselves.

 

It’s our behaviour stupid…

 

Despite research to the contrary we continue to regard ourselves as rational beings. Our investigation of accidents and incidents and response to them has generally been based on the idea that in reaching a decision or conclusion we will rationally consider all the information pertinent before acting. Simon1, the Nobel prize winning cognitive psychologist, as long ago as 1957, suggested otherwise.

 

His findings indicated that human decision making “consistently deviated from the processes and outcomes described by the models of rational choice”. He demonstrated that “in many situations people do not attempt to evaluate all available response choices in order to maximise their subjective expected utility, but rather consider only as many alternatives as needed to discover one that satisfies them.

 

He referred to this process as ”satisficing”.

 

In other words, we look at only sufficient parameters to satisfy us that the decision is ok. If it fits our “Map of the world” we are likely to go with it.

 

Classically the parameters that we use to reach a decision rationally include knowledge, skill and experience. We expect that if a person has a particular piece of knowledge then consequent behaviour is rationally predictable.

In reality we know that such linearity is almost never observed. How many people continue to smoke although the link to cancer is accepted as scientific fact? How many people die each day in accidents caused by driving too fast even though we all know the likely outcome?

 

So there are other factors at work influencing how we use our knowledge and skill. Other filters that we use to help us resolve the incoming data and reach conclusions and act and behave.

 

No its not, it’s our Beliefs and Values….

 

When something occurs in the world around us we must first experience it through our senses and then give it meaning before we can act.

 

The meaning we give an event is determined by a number of internal “filters”. Our language, values, attitudes, beliefs, memories, preferences and previous decisions are amongst the influences that we bring to bear on received information before assigning it an internal representation or meaning.

 

And the meanings we give external events are as diverse as there are people on the planet, because each of us has different experience and different preferences in how we use the filters.

 

Also, we are all able to change the meaning we assign to experienced events, even supposed automatic responses, such as to pain, can be changed. The same with threat. Many people overcome fear of something by simply changing their minds about it.

 

The mechanism for changing their minds might be through familiarity with a supposed obstacle, or “seeing it differently” or through other learning that makes the threat less overwhelming. Therapies for overcoming fear of heights or flying seek to use the above techniques to change a persons response to the threat.

 

The external event does not change, the height is still as high, aeroplanes still crash, but the meaning we have given it, what we believe about it, changes fundamentally.

 

Beliefs and values play perhaps the largest part in reaching decisions about how to act in many situations, particularly when judgement about something is required and data is subjective.

 

Beliefs are themselves judgements and evaluations about the world around us, other people and of course ourselves.2 On examination, beliefs resolve themselves into generalisations about:

 

1) Causation

2) Meaning

3) Boundaries in:

        o   The world around us

        o   Our behaviour

        o   Our capabilities

        o   Our identities.

 

You will have heard many statements that can be categorised as “belief” both from yourself and others.  For instance “God created the universe” and “The universe was created in a big bang” are both statements of belief relating to causation. “It is unethical to conceal information”, relates to our beliefs about the boundaries of behaviour. Similarly “It is not possible for a human being to run a mile in less than 4 minutes” is an example of belief in the boundaries of our capability.

 

Belief is at the core of motivation.

 

When we believe in something we are usually observed to be at our most highly motivated towards the belief or away from the consequences of it. If you do not believe in god or that god should be worshipped, you are very unlikely to visit a church regularly.

 

We all have values. The word of course means “the worth of something”, and we all have many things that are worth something to us. All of our values are learned.

 

Initially from our parents or carers in our early years, later we will test and adjust these “inherited” values refining and making a truly personal list of things that are important to us about life, work, people, cultures, and almost everything we experience.

 

Values have a hierarchy, and can be sorted into two loose groups, “means values” and ends values”.

 

Although many people will cite “Money” when asked about what they value, this is classed as a “means value” as the money itself is usually, upon examination, a means to a more valued end such as “security” or “freedom”.

 

When a person’s values are met in any social or workplace situation they will feel a sense of satisfaction and of being valued.

 

Conversely, where values are not met, the consequence will be dissatisfaction and resistance.

 

Many companies understand this and have “Mission and Vision” statements that are often lists of beliefs and values.

For example; “Organisational capability is our key competitive advantage” is a belief.

 

“Our values, which distinguish our company and enable organisational capability are:-

Honesty and Integrity.

Trust.

Diversity.

Communication.

Partnership.”

 

With these expressed values they seek to build a shared organisational culture, and when the values are recognised and shared there is harmony…sometimes.

 

If we believe in a company’s values then we are more likely to obey their rules and keep the company in compliance and profit.

 

If we believe the company’s rules are just window dressing then we are given permission to violate ourselves.

When a safety management system spends most of its time gathering dust on a shelf, or practice rarely follows the rules with no discernible consequence, then violation becomes normal behaviour.

 

And of course it is not as simple as that binary choice I just offered.

 

Difficulties arise even where we share values but have different beliefs or criteria about how the shared values are met.

 

For instance, two people may agree that “communication” is a shared value. However, one may believe that good communication is a set of precise accurate instructions delivered by email, and the other that a face to face meeting is required.

 

Similarly if one of our shared values is “trust”, we may believe that the company fails to “trust” us sufficiently, because it wants to assess our performance.

 

The company on the other hand, may believe that performance assessment is vital in establishing “trust” between it and its customers, as it can demonstrate the performance ability of its staff.

 

It may also believe that its use of performance assessment is one of the ways it expresses its value of “partnership”. Because only if it assesses how employees are doing, can it be a “partner” in their development and career path.

Sometimes an employee may believe that they cannot get the job done if they follow the rules strictly. So they bend or break them to “get the job done”, and in their way of thinking, helping and being a real “partner” in the company’s success.

 

So our behaviours can vary widely according to what we believe to be true about how a value should be expressed.

And the consequence is often this sort of dysfunctional conflict within the company.

 

When their core values are perceived as being enacted differently, or not at all, confusion reigns for staff.

 

And in this conflict are the seeds of permission for personnel to make their own judgements about what is acceptable operational behaviour.

 

A sense of injustice can grow when supervisors know the desired operational outcome cannot be achieved under the current procedures, but leave staff to “manage” the situation.

James Reason and Patrick Hudson’s papers and lectures on “A Fair and just culture”3 in safety management are powerful tools.

 

They identify good and bad safety behaviours, and the most common reasons behind rule violations.

 

Beyond this they identify the consequences that there should be for both “good” and “bad” behaviours.

 

They identify these consequences for individuals, teams, managers and the organisation as a whole.

 

And the point is that everyone can see the fairness and justice in the level of consequence that ripples out through an organisation when a violation occurs at any level.

 

If we go back to the example given earlier where the employee broke the rules because this was ”the only way to get the job done”.

 

In Patrick Hudson’s model, the individual would receive coaching on the need to speak up when rules cannot be followed. Investigation must also take place to understand how the situation was created and why work had continued.

 

The managers would also receive coaching. They would need to understand how to better identify situational problems that might lead to violations. They would receive minor discipline for allowing the situation to exist the first place.

 

And for the organisation, if the answer to the question “would others do it that way?” Is “yes”, then their procedures and management system need to be amended.

 

The transparent structure demonstrates honesty and integrity; it builds trust, and promulgates communication and partnership.

 

Consequences, what consequences?…

 

Although this can look complicated, it really boils down to consequence and how this is managed.

 

For the company and for the individual, consequence or lack of consequence moulds and controls behaviour.

 

As a simple example, imagine you were driving through a small country town at night. The speed limit is 30 mph. However, the town is well lit, and there is not a pedestrian, other vehicle, traffic light or road junction as far as you can see.

 

You might be tempted to make your own judgement about what a “safe speed” is under these circumstances, and proceed a little more quickly than the legal limit.

 

However if there were a policeman with a radar gun, or speed camera in sight, your decision will be different, no matter how “safe” you felt a faster speed might be.

 

And often a policeman just has to be there. They don’t need to take any action; just their presence reminds us of best practice.

 

And so it is with assessment.

 

Oh no, not assessment!…

 

As is often said when the subject of performance assessment is broached; “you don’t fatten pigs by weighing them…”.

 

And that is absolutely true, if that is all you did.

 

In fact weighing the pig tells you whether it actually needs fattening before market.

 

You can then make a better judgement about how much and how long it needs to be fed.

 

The key is to consider that that all assessment is formative, no matter where you are on the career ladder. Formative assessment is about informing people where they are against a scale of achievement.

 

It is also about informing the process of their development and performance— getting them the support they need.

Formative assessment is about informing the company of where they are in terms of their performance goals, and enabling them to improve management structure and culture.

 

Purposeful formative assessment supports work standards, personal standards, and safety management systems.

It guides development of on-the-job and external training.

 

It informs targeted management response to progress towards safety and other operational goals.

 

It is an essential component of mastery of any operation.

 

Ongoing formative assessment provides information that ripples out through the company, up and down the ladder, allowing better and better decisions to be made about performance, training and development.

Ultimately this must improve cost effectiveness.

 

If we recognise that professionals will make mistakes and develop unhealthy norms of performance, then assessment stands as the policeman to the company’s standards.

 

And this knowledge will in itself begin to change behaviours.

 

As individuals understand that formative assessment is part of the company’s culture, they will prepare for assessment, and more importantly, begin to self assess much more.

 

They will understand that formative assessment is about a roadmap to improvement.

 

This will help resist the growth of at risk behaviour and encourage reporting of hazards and errors.

 

The etymology or root of the word “assessment” is Latin. It is from the word “assidere” which means “to sit beside.”

 

Purposeful formative assessment involves everyone sitting beside each other learning and developing the company’s culture, management systems and operational procedures.

 

 

 

¹ H.A. Simon, quoted in “Making Decisions Under Stress” by Janis A Cannon-Bowers and Eduardo Salas, American Psychological Association 1998.

² For information on beliefs and values see “The Encyclopedia of Systemic Neuro Linguistic Programming and NLP new coding.” By Robert B. Dilts and Judith DeLozier, NLP university Press, 2000 and “Changing Belief Systems with NLP” Rober B dilts 1990.

³ Dr PTW Hudson,  Deft University; “Meeting Expectations: A New Model for a Just and Fair Cultlture”. A paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 Society of Petroleum Engineers International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production.